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1.1 Robots for Space 
The success of current and future human space exploration missions depends on effective integration of 
humans, automation, and robotic technology. Advancements in automation and robotics go hand-in-hand: 
better automation leads to more sophisticated and capable robots. NASA’s Human Research Program 
(HRP) identifies inadequate design of human, automation, and robotic integration as one of the risks to 
human health and performance. It recognizes that failure to design and deploy effective systems and user 
interfaces, or to properly allocate automation and robotic resources, will compromise mission objectives 
and safety. The focus of this chapter section is to provide an overview of robots for space operations and 
the unique challenges posed by including robots in space operations, in order to characterize the 
relationship between safety and human performance when robots are involved.   
In spaceflight, a generally accepted definition of a space telerobots is “a remotely operated robot that 
performs work in a rich space environment” (pg. 7, Fong et al 2013). Operators may be in space, 
experiencing either microgravity or partial-gravity, or on Earth. In general, there are two types of 
interactions people have with robots: remote interactions, where the robotic system is not co-located, and 
proximate interaction, where the robotic agent is co-located (Goodrich & Schultz, 2007). These two types 
of interactions bring about various issues regarding how robotic systems are used by or with people, 
termed human-robotic interaction (HRI). Robotic systems in the safety-critical domain of spaceflight are a 
driving function to carefully design and evaluate HRI.  
Fundamentally, robotic systems are necessary in spaceflight because they significantly increase our 
capabilities to live, work, and explore space. Arguably, these ought to be the only reasons to introduce 
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robotic systems into safety-critical domains. The benefits must outweigh the introduction of risk and 
safety concerns. These risks are robots inadvertently hurting astronauts and robotic operations 
unintentionally preventing mission success. Robotic systems need to do tasks that humans alone cannot 
complete, such as moving large space assets or scanning large areas of planetary surfaces. Robotic 
systems should also be leveraged to improve upon one of the most precious resources in space: people’s 
time. Space telerobots could be deployed to complete mundane tasks for astronauts, freeing up time for 
them to do other critical work. While intermingling robots and people has the potential of increasing 
safety risks, on the other hand, space telerobots can improve overall crew and mission safety. Spacewalks 
(or extravehicular activities, EVAs) outside the ISS are considered one of the riskiest activities for 
astronauts due to the limited time humans can spend in a fragile, pressurized spacesuit, exposed to 
additional radiation. Robotic systems that complete exterior tasks without EVA astronauts improve 
International Space Station (ISS) crew safety as it reduces the overall number of EVA hours. Similarly, 
planetary missions should leverage space telerobots to minimize Lunar or Mars radiation exposure or 
perhaps, exploring terrain treacherous terrain, protecting astronaut crew health in the long term. 
NASA currently leverages space telerobots to conduct critical space operations and is limited to two 
areas: large, robotic arms and planetary surface rovers. Building upon Shuttle’s heritage, the ISS regularly 
uses the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) to complete EVAs, capturing free-flying 
vehicles and complete maintenance tasks. It was used extensively during ISS construction; as recently as 
2015, the SSRMS was utilized to relocate a module (the large Permanent Multipurpose Module), 
allowing the installation of another docking port. The second robotic arm on ISS is the Special Purpose 
Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM), or Dextre, which plays a role in many of the exterior maintenance tasks 
required, such as inspection and relocation of Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs).  
These dexterous robotic arms enable astronauts to safely live and work aboard ISS. Ground teams use 
Dextre to complete many tasks while crew completes other interior activities. They enable critical tasks 
that could not have been accomplished otherwise. For instance, in late 2007, Astronaut Scott Parazynski 
repaired an ISS solar array, which could only be reached while propped by the Shuttle’s RMS (Cupples & 
Smith, 2011). SSRMS is essential for capturing visiting vehicles, including Space-X’s Dragon and 
Orbital’s Cygnus, and berthing them into one of the ISS docking ports. These spacecraft regularly 
resupply ISS with spare parts, science payloads, as well as food and medicine for astronauts. 
 
Figure 1: Astronaut Scott Parazynski (STS-120) attached at the end of Remote Manipulator System. 
Credit: NASA, ISS016E009207. 
Beyond low Earth orbit, NASA has deployed several rovers and landers on the Mars surface since 1976. 
Currently, there are two operational Mars rovers: Mars Exploration Rover, Opportunity, and Mars 
Science Laboratory, Curiosity. Each are equipped with a variety of scientific instruments and their own 
manipulator arm. The rovers traverse Mars, collecting data and analyzing samples for teams of scientists 
back on Earth. These rovers, far exceeding their planned lifetime, have increased our exploration 
capabilities, gathering scientific evidence to answer the question if Mars is or was habitable. Robotic 
missions, at first glance, may not appear to have an impact on space safety and human performance, but 
there are safety considerations for the human operators back on Earth. For example, the Curiosity mission 
purposefully determined to only operate on Mars time for the first 90 days. Unfortunately, Mars and Earth 
do not share the 24-hour day cycle. This meant that all the operators and scientists had to shift their work 
and sleep schedule 40 minutes every day. Such changes in circadian rhythm and sleep cycle have shown 
to have detrimental fatigue effects on people back on Earth, as experienced during Opportunity mission 
(Barger et al., 2012). 
While there is no imminent safety risk on the operators, there are mission safety considerations. 
Maintaining mission safety is still important and must be balanced against exploration objectives. For the 
rover missions, engineers and operators want to mitigate any risk that might damage the valuable 
spacecraft asset.  For that reason, the mission control team carefully plans out every command sent to the 
space telerobot, operating the rover well within its capabilities. Even under such risk-adverse operating 
constraints, unexpected circumstances still challenge mission operators to act safely. Notably, the 
Opportunity rover got stuck in a sand dune 446 sols into its surface mission (Helmick, Angelova, and 
Matthies, 2009). After a month, the engineers were able to maneuver it out. Such illustrative cases inform 
NASA of the indispensable value of good human-robotic interaction for crew and mission safety. 
2.1 Space Human-Robotic Interaction Design Challenges 
NASA’s Human Research Program (HRP) succinctly summarizes the interaction challenges (NASA, 
2017): Given that automation and robotics must seamlessly integrate with crew, and given the greater 
dependence on automation and robotics in the context of long-duration spaceflight operations, there is a 
risk that systems will be inadequately designed, resulting in flight and ground crew errors and 
inefficiencies, failed mission and program objectives, and an increase in crew injuries. Furthermore, it 
identifies four gaps or research areas for the Risk of Inadequate Design of Human and 
Automation/Robotic Integration (HARI):  
• We need to identify and scope the critical human-automation/robotic mission activities and tasks 
that are required for future long duration, long distance space missions. 
• We need to evaluate, develop, and validate methods and guidelines for identifying human-
automation/robot task information needs, function allocation, and team composition for future 
long duration, long distance space missions.   
• We need to develop design guidelines for effective human-automation-robotic systems in 
operational environments that may include distributed, non-colocated adaptive mixed-agent teams 
with variable transmission latencies. 
• We do not know how to quantify overall human-automation-robotic system performance to 
inform and evaluate system designs to ensure safe and efficient space mission operations. 
In many ways, the fact that NASA can relate automation and robotic integration concerns together speaks 
to the tight relationship between these technologies. We should be able to infer, or at the very least, 
anticipate potential pitfalls in HRI from what we know about HAI. For instance, it is likely that higher 
degree of automation in robotic systems should result in decrements in situation awareness, though it was 
only concluded from a meta-analysis by Onnasch, Wickens, Li, and Manzey (2014) for automated 
systems. Challenges with operators maintaining mode awareness or overreliance in automation have been 
recognized in the past (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Arguably, we may have already evidenced this in 
space operations when Opportunity accidently drove into non-navigable terrain. Operators may have 
assumed incorrectly the capabilities of the robotic systems or may have over-relied on the existing 
capabilities of the rover. 
Fundamentally, HRI challenges deal with the interaction between humans and robots. Goodrich & 
Schultz (2007) outline five attributes that affect HRI (pg. 216): 
• Level and behavior of autonomy, 
• Nature of information exchange,  
• Structure of the team, 
• Adaptation, learning, and training of people and robot,  
• Shape of the task. 
HRI design solutions for spaceflight are further constrained by the inherent nature of spaceflight. First, 
the space environment notably affects both robots and humans. Space-bound hardware systems need to be 
robust to survive environmental factors such as radiation, temperature extremes, illumination variations, 
and micrometeoroids (Fong et al., 2013). As a result, they usually are not as capable as their modern, 
Earth counterparts. Analogously, astronauts must live and work in microgravity (and partial gravity for 
exploration-class mission), exposed to high cumulative dosages of space radiation. Extended exposure to 
this extreme environment affects people’s physiology, and in turn, their performance duration space 
operations (for overview, see Jones, 2010; for more details, see Churchill, 1997). Furthermore, astronauts 
must perform in less-than-ideal habitats and workspaces, exposed to long-duration isolation, space-
efficient work-areas, and minimalist sleeping quarters. In turn, crews are at risk of experiencing chronic 
ergonomics-related disorders, prolonged sleep loss and corresponding fatigue, and other behavioral health 
issues (Jones, 2010). 
Second, the distance, spatially and temporally, between space telerobots and their operators further limits 
HRI designs. Long-distance space exploration has equivalent transmission latencies, and current deep 
space communication infrastructure prevents continuous, large bandwidth transmissions. Even if the 
bandwidth is mitigated with future improvements to NASA’s Deep Space Network, intermittent 
asynchronous communications result in unique space HRI designs. For Earth-Mars communication, one-
way transmission latencies range from four to twenty-four minutes, and about every two years, Mars solar 
conjunction prevents transmissions between the two planets. 
Considering future exploration-class missions, NASA’s Design Reference Missions, like NASA (2009) 
describe a particular team structure. Crew teams will be small, likely four astronauts, with various diverse 
backgrounds and expertise. On their way to Mars, there will not be opportunities to “bring in” a robotics 
expert or rotate in any specialty operator during the three-year long mission. This small team will bear the 
responsibility of learning and using all robotic systems required of the mission. The robotic systems 
available to them will also be assorted. Future capabilities for space telerobots range from partnering with 
astronauts to explore to maintaining habitats while in quiescence (Weisbin, Lavery, & Rodriguez, 1997; 
Marquez et al. 2016). Some robots will be co-located, others may be operated from long distances at first, 
and then while in line-of-sight. Along with the previously mentioned constraints, the diversity in robotic 
systems accompanied by a small crew team necessitates space HRI to include interfaces for the support 
heterogeneity, multiple control modes, and varying degrees of autonomy (Fong et al., 2013). 
2.1.1 	Illustrative	Space	HRI	Example:	Shape	of	Task	
In the last few years, robotics operations have become a critical component to berthing visiting vehicles.  
Crew and ground teams work together through the SSRMS to grapple and berth visiting vehicles (Figure 
2). Additionally, the visiting vehicle is undocked and moved with the SSRMS to a safe distance and 
trajectory from ISS for its return back to Earth. Berthing visiting vehicles is an adapted procedure from 
previously existing robotics tasks. For visiting vehicle operations, a robotics workstation is arranged by 
the crew within the Cupola to conduct the task and the task is coordinated between ground teams and 
onboard crewmembers. This new operation, which changed the shape of the previously vetted robotic 
tasks, require careful HRI evaluation, applying lessons learned regarding systems, procedures and 
operations collected over the life of ISS. 
 Figure 2: Astronaut Karen Nyberg (Expedition 36) at the robotics workstation in the ISS Cupola 
preparing for grappling and berthing of the Japanese H2 Transfer Vehicle-4 (HTV-4). Credit: 
NASA. 
The SSRMS manipulation for EVA-related robotics and visiting vehicle operations share many 
similarities with respect to tasks, but diverge in two key manners. First, visiting vehicle operations 
requires the SSRMS to capture another spacecraft moving in space. Second, despite using functionally the 
same robotic workstation, visiting vehicle operations requires the astronaut to integrate more (or different) 
information. There are two robotic workstations aboard the ISS, one in the Cupola, surrounded by 
windows, and the other is in the U.S. Lab module. The Cupola affords crew a direct view of the 
spacecraft and the SSRMS; this visual input thus must be integrated as part of the task. Crew commented 
that, initially, limited guidance was provided on how best to set up the robotic workstation in the Cupola. 
Additionally, there are many crew comments regarding the out-the-window lighting conditions (i.e., too 
bright or too dark) and their potential effect on performance (e.g., ability to assess out-of-window views 
like relative size or changing rates of motion). It is important to note that ground teams immediately 
addressed these crew comments to better support visiting vehicle robotic operations aboard ISS (Marquez 
et al., TBD). The adaptation of space robotics operations, using a single robotic system with a rich 
operational history, for a comparable yet slightly different task illustrates how challenging space HRI is 
and will be for future exploration-class missions. 
3.1  Developing Operationally-Valid Space HRI 
Through various space analogous test environments, NASA has begun to investigate the complexity of 
the design space encompassed by space-bound HRI: different types of robotic systems, control modes 
(manual through supervisory control), and operational concepts (co-located/proximal teaming, 1:many vs. 
many:1, robot before/after human, etc.). For example, there are several studies that have been performed 
aboard ISS. Robonaut 2 (R2), a highly dexterous humanoid robot, is currently aboard the ISS (Diftler et 
al., 2011) and is being evaluated as a means to reduce crew time by completing routine and redundant 
tasks. Bualat and her team tested remote surface telerobotics from the ISS (Bualat et al., 2013), while the 
European Space Agency has several ISS experiments evaluating methods of human-robotic interaction, 
including haptic feedback (Schiele et al., 2016).  On Earth, space robotic evaluations are difficult because 
it is hard 1) to have high fidelity simulations of all aspects of the space environment, 2) to acquire 
matching astronaut or ground controller populations, and 3) to mimic one-of-a-kind space telerobots 
(Fong et al., 2013). Nonetheless, in an effort to understand how to design human-robotic interaction for 
safe and efficient use, studies have examined rovers as scouts and as systems to follow-up after human 
exploration (e.g., Bualat et al., 2011; Deans et al., 2012). 
While exercising future space telerobots in extreme environments is essential for operationally validating 
safe and efficient human-robotic systems, there is still fundamental research that can be studied in 
laboratory settings. The HARI gaps (previously mentioned) recommend areas of investigation. For 
instance, developing user interface designs that quickly help operators recover situation awareness when a 
system enters an off-nominal state will be important for both highly autonomous and robotic systems.  
Seamless integration of various control modes will be indispensible in future space telerobotics, yet we 
have not developed design standards to accommodate these types of interactions, or to assess their 
impacts on situation awareness, workload, and task performance. There is much to learn and understand 
with regards to the effects of trust in safety of these robotic systems, particularly with robots that will be 
in close proximity with astronauts. Inadequate training may also play a role in trust, leading to automation 
biases, over or under-reliance on automation, increased operator workload, safety hazards, and failure of 
mission objectives. For example, Olsen al. (2011) acknowledges the importance of training to reduce 
biases and educate the operator on how the robot functions. Lastly, while we an infer a relationship 
between robotic tasks and fatigue, there is limited evidence that directly maps the relationship between 
sleep deprivation and the performance of human-automation/robotic systems. 
3.1.1 	Concluding	Remarks	
Future exploration-class missions will require heterogeneous robots to enable mission objectives without 
sacrificing safety. Good design is foundational to reducing integration risks, both of safety and of failure 
to complete missions due to inefficiency or ineffectiveness.  Continued work and research in human-
automation and human-robotic interaction will improve and inform NASA Standards 3001 in order to set 
standards for human-automation-robotic safety.  
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